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The influence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and in particular of this its higher 
Court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on all fields of European Law does not need to be 
demonstrated, as it has been extensively argued by legal doctrine. Divergence of opinion still persists 
on whether this influence is contained1 and prudent2 or innovative and activist,3 but it is widely 
accepted that rules produced, directly or indirectly, through interpretation of EU Law by the Court 
are mostly respected.4 Some political scientists argue that Member States elaborate European Policy 
at intergovernmental level, while other maintain that, given the difficulty in reaching consensus 
among EU Member States prompts a ‘judicialisation’ of the EU governance (neo-functionalism). 
According to the latter theory the Court sets legal principles that induce policy reforms, which in turn 
underpin further European jurisprudence, in a virtuous circle.5 Both these theories inform and enrich 
the discussion on the normative function of the Court, instrumental to European integration, already 
discussed by previous commentators of European law.6 
In 2015, the author of this Chapter, together with her colleagues, undertook the study of the Court 
and its rulings, in order to assess its role in shaping European copyright law. However, we did so by 
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implementing on this interesting area of studies an empirical approach never attempted before. 
First, we analysed the background of the judges, looking for specific competence and professional 
experience in Intellectual Property.7 Second, we studied the rulings of the Court and the Opinions of 
the Advocate Generals in order to understand which legal approach was more often used, and 
whether a pattern could be detected.8 Third, we processed the written observation of Member 
States in each copyright case before the Court, to identify and assess divergences and convergences, 
in order to highlight the most sensitive areas and eventually in order to discover the impact of each 
Country on the Courts’ judgment.9  
The present Chapter will tell this story, including the key steps, difficulties, and achievements of this 
empirical experience. 
 
2. The Role of the ECJ in EU Governance  
 
Member States are not always happy with the rulings of the Court, but either when they agree10 or 
not, 11  they  seem to largely implement its jurisprudence. Overturning the Court’s judgment in fact 
requires a modification of the Treaties12 and in addition the Court enjoys support by legal and 
political entities.13 Moreover, it has been argued that the Court is trying to counter its own potential 
over-expansion by a careful choice of its own approaches.14 
ECJ scholars are divided between those claiming that the Court represents the interest of the most 
powerful EU Member States (the Principal-Agent theory)15 and others claiming that the Court is 
impartial, independent, and conscious of its reputation and mandate, as many international courts 
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(Trustee rather than Agent).16 Albeit not immune from policy influence and pressure, the ECJ often 
produces rulings that are both unexpected and uncontrolled by National Governments.17 The analysis 
of the above literature suggests that the evolution of the Court does not follow a linear path. In 
essence, the EU judges alternate in time legal innovation and conservative interpretation of EU law.18 
This is true both for different subject matters and for different periods.19  
All these reflections of copyright scholars -albeit to a different extent- convert in saying that the 
Court produces significant changes to EU policies.20 In addition, the Court’s thematic jurisdiction 
witnessed a gradual expansion, including highly technical subject-matters (for example, 
constitutional law, competition law, labour law, etc.). Nonetheless, not all these legal areas are 
represented within the professional backgrounds of the judges, nor there are in the ECJ (unlike the 
General Court) specialised chambers. On occasion, this has raised concerns about its credibility.21 In 
the specific field of copyright, for example, it has been suggested that the judgements of the Court 
step in where in European law are gaps and loopholes. According to some commentators this course 
of action of the Court appears to be motivated by an agenda aimed at harmonising the EU legal 
framework, to the detriment  of rigorous subject-specific reasoning. It is nowadays largely accepted 
by current copyright scholarship that the Court builds up its own concepts of copyright law (for 
example the concept of ‘new public’ in relation to the right to communication to the public); it is 
debatable whether this is done intentionally to advance a harmonising or political agenda.22 
Unlike most legal system, the text of European law does not provide the criteria to interpret its own 
legislation and norms; therefore, thanks to the inherent indeterminacy of European law, the Court 
can use legal interpretation to transcend its traditional function. Hence, the jurisprudence of the 
Court, with its express guidance on interpretation but also with its most current practice, includes 
the directions on how the acquis communautaire has to be construed. A typical example of specific 
directions issued by the Court is detectable in the landmark case CILIFT23, where the Court stated 
several principles: first, that Community legislation is drafted in several languages, all of which are 
authentic and which have to be compared; secondly, that Community law has its specific 
terminology; thirdly, that European law need to be put in context and interpreted according to the 
purpose of community law as a whole.24 
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3. Rules of procedure25 
 
Before starting the analysis of the Copyright Jurisprudence before the Court, a few notes on the rules 
of procedure are in order.  This will help understanding what the role of written observations is and at 
what point in time they get to the attention of the Court.  
The procedure of preliminary ruling is prompted by a reference from a national court of a Member 
State. The national court requires from the Court the interpretation of a point of European Law, 
which might indirectly involve the infringement of EU law from the Member State.26 The reference is 
lodged with the Registrar's Office, which deals with the translation of the full text of the reference 
into the EU official languages. The Registrar also defines the category within which the case should be 
classified (e.g. the legal subject-matter, as for example ‘social security' or ‘citizenship’ etc.).27 The 
case is then transferred to the President of the Court and to the First Advocate General. 
The President of the Court assigns the case to a chamber, and appoints a Reporting Judge within this 
chamber, whereas the First Advocate General assigns the case to an Advocate General. According to 
the procedural rules of the Court, no particular order, as for example a rotation order, is provided for 
the assignment of a case to a particular chamber. The only rule established by the procedure in terms 
of case assignment provides that particularly important cases can be entrusted to the Court in its 
formation as Grand Chamber.28 
The case assignment to the Reporting Judge and to the AG is made again without specific procedural 
rules (e.g. there is no rotation among Court Members). However, it is frequent that the same judges 
and the same AGs are responsible for cases relating to similar subject-matter.29 Usually the AG to 
whom a case is assigned does not belong to the Member State involved in the litigation, or to the 
Member State of one of the parties in the case of a preliminary ruling.30 However, this unwritten rule 
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30 Burrows and Greaves ibid, 23. 
is not always followed.31 
Once a case has been assigned, the “interested parties” have two months, from the notification of 
the order from reference, to submit their written observations.  These “interested parties” are: a) the 
litigants before the national court, b) the Member States, c) the EU commission, EU Parliament, the 
Council, the European Central Bank, d) in some cases, the other EEA states, the EFTA supervising 
authority or a non-member state which is party to an agreement providing its participation within 
determined subject-matters.32 Written submissions of such statements of case, defences, and 
observations by the parties and by any intervener are received by the Registrar and circulated among 
the panellist judges and the AG. The submissions are accompanied, where possible, by the relevant 
documentary evidence. After the parties have filed their submissions, the Reporting Judge writes a 
preliminary report, to be presented at the Court general meeting,33 in which a summary of the case is 
made. The summary includes the main fact situation, the norms potentially applicable, previous 
referable case law, the questions referred by the national courts and the suggested answers of the 
parties and of the intervening Governments.34 The Reporting Judge might also indicate points of 
national law that need further clarifications or even details of the fact situation that would need 
further measures of inquiry. He or she can suggest to which formation of the Court the case should 
be assigned and whether to dispense with the hearing or the opinion of the AG.35 
After the conclusion of the written part, a date for the hearing, if a hearing must be held, is fixed. At 
the hearing, the pleadings of the parties and any observation by interveners are heard by the panel of 
judges that forms the chamber. If a supplement of inquiry is necessary, also witnesses and experts are 
heard by the Court. In the procedure for preliminary ruling the parties do not have the chance to 
reply in writing to the introductory statements of their adversary, therefore they respond to their 
argument at the hearing.36   
After the parties have exposed their arguments, at a request of the president of the chamber, the 
Reporting Judge and the AG can ask for clarifications of the speakers. Finally, the Advocate General 
can issue his or her Opinion, but more often a date is announced for an opinion to be issued, around 
a month later.37 In the Opinion, the AG exposes thoroughly any doctrinal and jurisprudential 
arguments underpinning her proposed solution of the case. Alternative draft opinions can also be 
submitted by the AG to the Court, supporting different arguments.38 After the reading of the 
conclusions of the Opinion of the AG, the oral procedure is officially closed. However, the hearing can 
be reopened, after the submission of the AG, if further measures of inquiry are required.39 
Before the deliberation, the Reporting Judge circulates a note to the other judges to suggest a draft 
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ruling for the case. In this note she will state her agreement or disagreement with the opinion of the 
Advocate general. Any dissenting judge will normally circulate another note to express her views. If 
there is clear disagreement on a case within the Court, a meeting would be normally set to discuss 
the matter.40 Dissenting opinions of any member of the panel are not cited in the judgement. 
Normally, the Opinion of the AG is not cited in detail within the judgement either. If the ruling 
disagrees with the opinion of the AG, it elaborates its own legal reasoning. In alternative, when the 
judges agree with the Opinion, they refer to it in full or in part, often without restating the arguments 
expressed therein.41  
The AG, in her Opinion, analyses previous Court case law on the same issue and, if necessary, points 
out discrepancies and inconsistencies of the Court's previous legal reasoning. A comparative analysis 
of Member States legislation can also be included in the Opinion in order to support the arguments 
of the AG.42 Overall, the opinion of the Advocate General provides the most detailed and exhaustive 
analysis of the case, and it is often much more voluminous than the ruling. Interestingly, some 
Opinions offer an overview of the written observations submitted by the “interested parties” before 
proceeding to analyse the case, some don’t. Even when they do, however, they do not necessarily 
cite all the written observations. Also, the Preliminary Report from the Judge-Rapporteur, which 
routinely displays an overview of the submissions before the Court, sometimes overlooks some 
written observations.  
 
4. The legal approaches used by the Court and the legal background of the judges 
 
The legal interpretative approaches (or topoi) of the ECJ have been reported by EU law 
commentators and broadly reflect the European legal tradition: they are divided in 
semantic/semiotic, contextual/systematic, and teleological/dynamic. In addition, peculiar canons 
specific to the EU (effet utile, proportionality principle, uniform application, etc.) must be considered. 
The literature does not dispute the number and classification of these legal approaches, but it 
debates around their use. Some studies on European judiciary argue that the Court favours 
teleological canons to semantic interpretations and therefore shows an arbitrary lack of balance in 
the weight assigned to such topoi.43 Other commentators disagree with this construct. For example, 
Bengoetxea and Beck in their respective research, argue that semantic arguments are preferred by 
the Court whenever the text of the law is clear, detailed, and univocal (especially in different 
translations). These scholars maintain that whenever the Court gives to semantic arguments less 
weight than most high courts, this is because of the inherent ambiguity of European law.44 
To summarise: The literature review identified the following problematic issues in the approach of 
the ECJ in interpreting and applying European law:  
a) the Court is said to over-use teleological interpretation in order to carry out its harmonising 
agenda; b) the rulings of the Court do not reveal a consistent and foreseeable pattern, apart from the 
consolidation of European law;  
c) this happens in particularly with relation to subject-specific areas, where the Court relinquish 
specialist doctrine in favour of a European agenda. 
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33 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European 
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The first empirical study related in this Chapter has explored how the Court of Justice of the 
European Union has dealt with copyright cases and in particular whether it is true that: (i) that the 
Court did not develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence following its lack of specialised expertise, 
(lack of copyright specific reasoning, and therefore predictability); (ii) that the Court has pursued an 
activist, harmonising agenda by using the teleological approach way above the needs of its remit. 
The study implemented different measures to assess each of these claims. First, it tried to identify 
specific pre-existing (in their professional background prior to joining the Court) judicial expertise in 
the area of copyright and related rights to discuss and ascertain the suspected lack of a coherent 
copyright jurisprudence. To this end, the biographical data about members of the Court, available on 
the Court website, were analysed. We found that the members of the European Court of Justice are 
mainly ex-academics, civil servants, judges, or all these things. Prior to joining the Court, they have 
mostly a professional career in European Law or Public Law. Some subject-specific competences 
(criminal matters, family law, competition and commercial law) are present in the background of 
some judges, especially the one appointed more recently, but not all areas are covered. Interestingly 
for our case, any of the examined curriculum displays a specific copyright expertise, despite the 
increasing workload of the Court on these matters. 
However, the recurrent assignment of copyright cases to the same judges suggested that Court 
attempts to compensate for this lack of specialisation by enabling ‘judicial learning’. The allocation of 
cases to Chambers, Reporting Judges and Advocates General in fact reveals that this pattern of 
consistent allocations is statistically significant, and can only be explained by a deliberate intention 
by the Court to overcome this lack of pre-existing expertise with the creation of de facto specialist 
chambers. 
The claim of lack of a coherent jurisprudence was measured in the study by looking for unpredictable 
patterns of reasoning. The content analysis carried out in the study suggests for example that despite 
the interpretation of the concept of ‘communication to the public’ prompted different outcomes in 
different cases, according the coding all the above cases are grounded on a semantic interpretation 
of the law, confirmed by a teleological interpretation and by a systematic interpretation. All the topoi 
are used in all the cases. However, when applying quantitative analysis to the use of specific 
arguments within topoi (for example, the balance of rights, or a high protection for the author), we 
find that the reasoning of the most frequently appointed judge in copyright cases, judge Malenovský 
(rapporteur in twenty-four of forty copyright cases) differs from that of the other judges. This may be 
an indicator of judicial learning. We are fully aware of the methodological limitations of quantitative 
analysis carried out on a relatively small sample. However, the study is meant to be scalable, and 
potentially applicable to a larger sample: the same pattern on a larger sample would be significant. 
Regarding the second claim, that the Court has pursued an activist, upwardly harmonising agenda, 
the study attempts to measure indications for such an agenda by exploring the possible prevalence 
of a teleological interpretation of European law within the document examined (by content analysis 
of all copyright judgments in the data sample. The analysis shows in fact a clear prevalence of 
teleological topoi, however, the full picture showed a complex patterns of accumulation (e.g. 
cumulative use of several approaches without a hierarchical order). This suggests that possibly a 
more complex explanation is required, especially if we add to the picture the fact that the outcomes 
of the judgments do not (systematically) expand copyright protection. 
In answer to the overall research question posed by this study ‘Is there an EU copyright 
jurisprudence?’ its findings paint an intriguing picture. The research suggested that there are 
attempts by the Court to create in effect specialist chambers. Also, albeit the analysis suggests the 
presence of recurrent patterns of reasoning, the outcomes from these very reasoning remain 
unpredictable; this is especially evident when less copyright-experienced members of the Court are 
charged with the ruling. In conclusion, what this study and its pioneer empirical approach (with all its 
limitations) seems to suggest is that while the Court’s jurisprudence is more performant than its 
critics suggest, more can be done to improve its legitimacy. 
At the end of its analysis the study attempted to examine possible policy solutions to assist the Court 
to form a more coherent copyright jurisprudence. These were the recommendations we elaborated 
at the conclusion of this study: “The most straightforward solution might introduce specialised 
(copyright or intellectual property) professionals into the European Court system in order to increase 
domain competence and predictability. Short of forming a specialist Court, interventions might 
include (i) reforming the rules of procedure by making criteria for the assignment of cases more 
explicit (enabling the systematic allocation of cases to certain chambers where new members might 
shadow reporting judges that have developed domain specific experience), and (ii) supporting 
judicial learning when members first join the Court (for example through training of référendaires in 
specialist domains). Exploring such options seriously would require the Court (and the European 
institutions that invented its governance) to look in the mirror, hold the gaze and recognise what 
they see. Empirical reflection may yet improve doctrine.”45 
 
5. The impact of written observations of Member States on the Rulings of the Court 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is quite unique among international courts in that 
it is involved  in what has been called “a notable juridification of the European policy process”.46 In a 
time in which European Union unity is challenged by allegations of inefficiencies of the system, it 
particularly crucial to understand how the European judges perform their role in a contested political 
environment. To this end, we should not assume the legal autonomy of the Court from the influence 
of Member States but, more realistically, we should put the behaviour of the CJEU in context and 
investigate the process by which a decision is reached, within its full picture.   
In fact, political scientist focusing on the study of EU governance, are sceptic on the assumption of 
autonomous action of the Court. It has in fact suggested that the Court’s decisions are influenced by 
the anticipated reactions of national governments.47 The empirical approach of this third study 
focuses on the analysis study of Member States’ written observations to investigate the impact that 
the stance of individual governments on copyright cases has on the jurisprudence of the Court. 
In her precursor research on the behaviour of Governments before the Court, Marie-Pierre Granger48 
argued that carrying out a study to measure the impact of Governments’ written observations was 
not feasible. It true that the ‘written observations’ are treated as ‘confidential’, and are no longer 
published in the Court proceedings, and therefore this task is particularly difficult. When planning 
this third empirical study however, it was decided that was essential to overcome these obstacles if 
we wanted to make a significant advance in understanding the role of national governments in 
relation to the Court of Justice.   
With the assistance of supportive Agents before the Court, the Court Registry, fellow academics and, 
in the most difficult cases, with the support of Freedom of Information requests (both under 
Regulation 1049/2001 and national legislation), I have been able to collect a nearly comprehensive 
                                                          
45  Favale et al (n. 7) 75. 
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database of governments’ written observations and in 42 copyright cases before the ECJ. This 
includes the observations of the EU Commission. Thanks to the coding and subsequent analysis of 
this precious material the study was able to draw a picture on whether and how Member States and 
the Commission are influencing the Court in a specific subject domain.  
Political science research has been preliminarily studied to identify previous approaches employed to 
answer this question. In particular, empirical socio-legal research has suggested that various 
organisations try to implement strategic litigation  by pushing preliminary references to steer judicial 
policy,49 Member States can use their written observations to the same end.50 According to some 
scholars, governments intervene in European  litigation to try to obtain decisions in line with their 
own policies,51 because they understand the value of well-written and well-argued observations in 
the context of political strategies.52 On the other hand, Member States have realised that with 
successful interventions before the Court they can reverse some of the European policies that they 
opposed without success in the EU Council.53 In this context, it needs to be added the theory by 
which the European judges are conscious in their rulings of the possibility of overturning or 
disapplication from the referring Member State, and they act accordingly.54 
While the overall research question of the study is: “who is steering copyright jurisprudence?” a 
number of sub-questions need and have been empirically addressed:  
i. What are the most contested legal concepts in EU Copyright Law? 
ii. Who are the Governments interested in shaping copyright jurisprudence and, specifically, on 
which legal concepts are they intervening? 
iii. What interests are Governments supporting (e.g. rightholders’ or users’)? 
iv. To what extent are Governments successful in steering the Court towards their interpretation 
of legal concepts? 
 
To this end, we recall, the study has used document analysis (coding), qualitative methods 
(structured questionnaire followed by an unstructured feedback on our preliminary findings) and 
basic statistical computation of the data.  
First, doctrinal analysis was used to identify groups of preliminary references demanding 
clarifications from the Court on the same copyright concept (for example, ‘communication to the 
public’). The dataset, consisting of 78 copyright cases registered between 1998 and 2015 (and 
concluded before the Court) was clustered based on the main legal concept examined within each 
preliminary reference. The analysis showed that most preliminary references were filed on only five 
recurrent concepts, which therefore received more attention from the CJEU. 
                                                          
49 Hialte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Martinus Nijoff, 1986) 270. 
50 Granger (n 48) 1. 
51 Thomas H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403. 
52 Anthony Michael Collins, ‘Representation of a Member State before the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities: practice in the United Kingdom’ 27 E.L.Rev. (2002) 359. 
53 Granger (n 48)  9. 
54 See Carrubba et al. (n 1) 9. On the same topic of the impact on CJEU decisions of possible Member States 
non-compliance see also Geoffrey Garrett, Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz, ‘The European Court of 
Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’ 52(1) International 
Organization (1998) 149-176.  
Secondly, content analysis (expert coding) was employed. Preliminary references include a number 
of questions from the national court to the ECJ. Each submission argues for a number of prospective 
responses to these questions. The coding identified: 
a) the questions (reformulated to require a Yes/No answer) b) the suggestions argued in the 
written observations from governments and EU institutions (mostly the EU Commission); 
b) their acceptance or rejection of these suggestions in the final ruling of the Court.  
Thirdly, the study used statistical analysis to establish relationships between the outcome of the case 
and the written observations. It assesses  
a) the interests of governments in a particular legal concept (e.g. number of submissions that 
intervene on this concept);  
b) the correlation between the suggested interpretation of individual copyright concepts within each 
submission and the interpretation of these concepts in the decision in each case.   
To this end, the occurrence of government submissions, when the same country is the origin of the 
preliminary reference, was measured. Then, the number of ‘successful’ arguments was computed in 
order to measure the potential influence that each submission had on the ruling. The main limit of 
this approach is that the study only looked at the suggested answer to each question and did not 
deal with the reasoning (which in practice may diverge) argued in each submission and in the rulings. 
To explore possible explanations for the observed patterns, finally, these findings have been 
circulated among Court Agents in order to collect their reactions and feedback, which have been 
incorporated in the Conclusion. The feedback was largely positive and there was no objection by the 
Agents (as the methodological limits were pre-emptively already discussed in the study. 
In the specific area of copyright law, the study shed new insight to explain the forces moving the ECJ 
jurisprudence. It was found that copyright interventions revolve mainly around some specific and 
recurring legal concepts through the whole sample of cases. The analysis of recurrent legal issues 
before the Court of Justice confirms that there are areas of copyright law vulnerable to strategic 
litigation, arguably because of a normative void.  
The study found that through written observations, Governments aim to steer the Court towards 
rulings in line with their respective policies. Member States most invested in copyright law are the 
dominant litigators of the acquis communautaire in general although there are other Member States 
that invest disproportionately in shaping the evolution of copyright law. 
Interestingly, the study has revealed that the impact of a written observation on the ruling of the 
Court is not only determined by critical mass, such as the number of submissions or the size of the 
country. More important appears to be the quality of the legal reasoning, as the relative success of 
countries investing less in strategic litigation. 
Despite all its limits, therefore, the above empirical effort delivered unprecedented insights in the 
European jurisprudential production, and deserver to be further exploited, corrected, pursued. 
 
6. The Confidentiality Issue 
To fully understand the difficulties of carrying out this particular empirical study, an important issue 
should probably be addressed. The story of the bumps on the road of document collection are 
integral to the difficulties related to legal empirical research, and therefore deserve to be reported. 
Documentary material for this research consists of case documents of the Preliminary References 
included in the relevant sample. In particular, the Ruling, the Opinion, and the written observations 
from Governments are needed to the study. While the Ruling and the Opinion for each case are 
available on the CJEU website,55 Government Submissions are not publicly available. They are treated 
as ‘confidential’. 
First, the Court Registry was contacted in order to apply for accessing these documents, although 
aware that the Court is not mentioned among the EU institutions currently subject to the current EU 
regulation to access public documents.56  I thought we could rely on a number of factors: a) our 
purpose to access for scientific research; b) the promise to keep the document confidential; c) the 
justification for exclusion of judiciary documents in current EU and national regulations (which in my 
opinion does not apply to our case).  
The Registry responded that they cannot grant access to the submission because the Government 
Submissions are confidential. This is not the place to fully argue what we call ‘the confidentiality 
issue’ of the submissions before the CJEU. However, we thought it would be useful to explain as 
much as possible the factor c). 
In EU Member States, Freedom of Information acts (FOIA) or equivalent laws allow the fundamental 
freedom to access administrative documents, in order to promote citizen participation to the 
democratic process. These documents normally refer to the deeds of the public administration. In 
many cases, these regulations provide for a number of exclusions, normally to protect the public 
interest, or trade secrets, or privacy. In some of them57 judicial proceedings are not excluded per se, 
but only when the proceeding could be endangered by the disclosure. The British FOIA for example 
excludes access to administrative documents when justified by the need to preserve the 
administration of justice.58 The French corresponding law excludes the documents whose disclosure 
would harm judicial proceedings.59 In both cases, it is arguable that possible harm can only occur 
during the proceeding, not after. Moreover, not all FOIAs mention judicial proceedings among the 
exclusions.60  
The EU has its own version of a FOIA in the form of Regulation 1049/02, which allows access to the 
documents issued by the three main EU institutions: The Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission. Since the CJEU is formally excluded by this Regulation, it has issued at the end of 2012 a 
Decision61 that largely borrowed from the norms and principles of the Regulation. However, with 
                                                          
55  <http://curia.europa.eu/> 
56  REGULATION (EC) No 1049/2001 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJEC L 145/43 
31.05.2001 (hereinafter ‘Regulation’). 
57  Since a comprehensive analysis of the confidentiality issue is not the object of this chapter, we cannot 
provide data for all the EU Member States. 
58  s.31(1)(c) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, online at 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents> accessed 29 August 2016. 
59  Art L 311-5 1(f) III Livre of the Code des relations entre le public et l'administration available at < 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=EC81FBDD47E7DFC61E67FA6722180535.tpdila09
v_2?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000031367696&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000031366350&dateTexte=20160830> 
accessed 30 August 2016. 
60  Italy, for example, does not include judicial proceedings per se among the exceptions listed in Art 24, L. n. 
241/1990("Nuove norme in materia di procedimento amministrativo e di diritto di accesso ai documenti 
amministrativi") Gazzetta Ufficiale del 18 agosto 1990 n. 192,  as modified by L. 15/2005. The law is 
available online at <http://www.altalex.com/documents/codici-altalex/2014/12/09/legge-sul-
procedimento-amministrativo> accessed 29 August 2016. Other countries, such as the Scandinavians, grant 
full access to all public documents, including Court proceedings, unless a superior interest is endangered. 
61  DECISION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION of December 2012 concerning public access 
this Decision the Court grants access to the documents it holds “in the exercise of its administrative 
function”.  This principle would exclude the documents held for the purpose of its judiciary function. 
Also, these European FOIAs include a number of exceptions62  to the freedom to access 
administrative documents. The Regulation for example excludes a number of cases where the 
disclosure would undermine the protection of commercial interest, court proceedings or legal 
advice.63 These exceptions however are subject to limits. In particular, they do not apply if there is 
an overriding public interest to the disclosure.64 Even more interestingly for our study, limits to the 
access to the Court documents are limited to the time frame during which this prohibition is 
justified.65  
Importantly, our application to access Government submissions only relates to cases already 
concluded; and otherwise our access to these documents would not affect any of the specific 
interests mentioned above, either by the national or European regulations.  In fact, the exclusion of 
court proceedings in the above-mentioned regulations either affects those that protect a sensitive 
interest (public interest, personal or sensitive data, trade secrets), or those whose disclosure would 
affect the proceeding itself.  
The CJEU in its own jurisprudence considered the excludability of court pleadings from disclosure in 
Sweden v. API, and concluded that judicial deeds can be excluded per se, because of the need to 
preserve the ‘serenity of judgements’66 and the ‘equality of arms’.67 This case is interesting because 
the Court argues the rationale of the EU legislation (from the TFEU68 to the Regulation) for the 
exclusion of judiciary deeds (‘pleadings’) from the freedom of access. The CJEU specifies that its 
documents are rightly excluded from the Regulation ‘while those proceedings remain pending’.69  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to documents held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the exercise of its administrative 
functions (2013/C 38/02) (hereinafter “Decision”). Article 1. Scope 1. “The present decision shall apply to all 
documents held by the Court of Justice of the European Union, that is to say, documents drawn up or 
received by it and in its possession, as part of the exercise of its administrative functions”. 
62  Decision, « Exceptions:  2. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall refuse access to a document 
where disclosure would undermine the protection of: 
— commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property, — court proceedings 
and legal advice, — the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits”. 
63  Art 4.2 of the Regulation, which excludes, among others ‘court proceedings and legal advice’. 
64  Decision, Art 4. “The exceptions set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply if there is an overriding public 
interest in disclosure of the document concerned”. 
65  Art 7 Regulation and Art 6 Decision « The exceptions as laid down in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall apply only 
for the period during which protection is justified on the basis of the content of the document. …” 
66  See joined cases C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission [2010] ECR I-8533 
para 93, where the CJEU states  “exposing judicial activities to external pressure, albeit only in the 
perception of the public, and would disturb the serenity of the proceedings”. It needs to be specified that 
the case at hand regards a disclosure of Commission’s documents under Reg1049/02 not access to 
Governments written observation 
67  Ibid, para 87 “In addition, such a situation could well upset the vital balance between the parties to a 
dispute before those Courts – the state of balance which is at the basis of the principle of equality of arms – 
since only the institution concerned by an application for access to its documents, and not all the parties to 
the proceedings, would be bound by the obligation of disclosure.” In this ruling however the Court 
considers the disclosure of submissions from the EU commission; it argues that the principle would be 
trumped because only one party (the Commission) would be bound to disclosure, and not the others. We 
however required the disclosure of all submissions, hence respecting the principle of “equality of arms”. 
68  Article 255 EC. 
69  Ibid, para 94 “It is therefore appropriate to allow a general presumption that disclosure of the plead ings 
lodged by one of the institutions in court proceedings would undermine the protection of those 
proceedings, for the purposes of the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, while those 
Moreover, Government submissions are not documents produced by the parties of the judicial 
controversy. They are mere legal opinions on points of law raised before the Court by the Referring 
national court. One may wonder whether they could not be considered as the “third party 
documents” mentioned by Article 9 of the above-mentioned Court Decision. According to this article, 
when the Court is required to disclose a document received by a third party (which can include a 
Member State) it will have to consult said third party before granting access to the applicant.70 
Many CJEU commentators and practitioners have called for reform of the Statutes regulating the 
Court towards greater transparency.71  Some argue that the very case law of the Court in terms of 
access to documents of the European Institutions calls for a revision of Regulation 1049/200172. 
Among EU institutions, the Council of Europe is actively pursuing a policy of transparency for EU 
public institutions. For example, the Council issued an international convention than needs yet two 
ratifications in order to enter in force.73 Moreover, In a Recommendation on access to administrative 
documents, 74 the Council lists ten possible limitations to this right to access.75 One of these applies 
to our case: the equality of parties concerning court proceedings. This limitation, according to the 
guidance of the Council, would “allow a public authority to refuse access to its own documents so as 
not to weaken its position during proceedings to which it is a party”.76 Now, in this study’s sample of 
preliminary references the Government is never a party. The intervention of a Government in these 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
proceedings remain pending.” 
70  Art 4.4 Regulation and Art 9 Decision quoted “Third party documents 1. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union shall not grant access to third party documents in its possession until it has received the 
consent of the third party concerned. 2. For the purposes of the present article, ‘third party’ shall mean any 
natural or legal person or body external to the Court of Justice of the European Union, including the 
Member States, the other institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union and non-
member States. 3. When the Court of Justice of the European Union receives an application for access to a 
third party document, the competent authority shall consult the third party concerned in order to ascertain 
whether the third party opposes release of that document, unless it decides of its own motion to refuse to 
release the document on the basis of one of the exceptions set out in Article 3”. 
71  As an example of academic concerns see generally Alberto Alemanno ‘Unpacking the Principle of Openness 
in EU Law: Transparency, Participation and Democracy (2013) European law review 39(1):72-90. As an 
example of practitioners concerns see generally the intervention of Michael Patchett-Joyce, Barrister at the 
Hearing on the Reform of the Court of Justice of the European Union 24 April 2013 Brussels, available at< 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201305/20130521ATT66428/20130521ATT6642
8EN.pdf>  accessed 20 August 2016. 
72  See two notes by Prof. Henry Labayle requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs, ‘’L’ accés du public aux documents de l’Union europèenne, ètat du droit à l’instant 
de la rèvision du réglement 1049/2001 », PE 393.287, 2008 and  « Les documents classifiés à la lumière du 
traité de Lisbonne », PE 425.616, 2010. 
73  Council of Europe convention on access to public documents, available at < 
http://www.coe.int/fr/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/205> accessed 20 August 2016.  The 
convention has been ratified by 8 countries. It will enter into force with 10 ratifications. 
74  Recommendation Rec (2002)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on Access to Official 
Documents (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 21 February 2002 at the 784th meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies) 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/Publications/DocAccess_Guide_en.pdf> accessed 29 
August 2016. 
75  Ibid, 27. Possible limitations are for: i. national security, defence and international relations; ii. public safety; 
iii. the prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal activities; iv. privacy and other legitimate 
private interests; v. commercial and other economic interests, be they private or public; vi. the equality of 
parties concerning court proceedings; vii. nature; viii. inspection, control and supervision by public 
authorities; ix. the economic, monetary and exchange rate policies of the state; x. the confidentiality of 
deliberations within or between public authorities during the internal preparation of a matter. 
76  Ibid, 15. 
preliminary references, not featuring said Government as a party, can be assimilated to an amicus 
curie: a legal opinion from a third party.  Accessing these legal opinions, after the ruling has been 
issue, can hardly weaken the position of a party in that proceeding. 
Finally, these legal opinions from Governments, as this study confirms, are strategically used by 
Member States to shape the legislation through jurisprudence. They could therefore assimilate in 
nature more to proposals in a legislative process than to pleadings in litigation between parties; and 
as we know the European legislative process is subject to the highest standard of transparency. 
 
7. Conclusion:  
 
These two empirical studies on copyright jurisprudence of the ECJ were initially motivated by the 
need to gain an understanding the working of the ECJ and the influence and impact it has on the 
production of European legal framework. At the same time, there was the ambition to look at the EU 
jurisprudence (in this pilot stage limited to copyright law) from another point of view, different from 
the usually employed tools of black letter legal research. During every stage of this long and exciting 
adventure my colleagues and I have always been aware of the important limitations of this approach: 
transforming the convoluted nuances of legal reasoning in data point is certainly one of the most 
difficult challenges. These difficulties, moreover, are exacerbated by the fact that this is the first work 
of this kind undertaken on European jurisprudence. In time, the methodology could be adjusted and 
corrected, and it could provide an exceptional contribution to legal research.  
When the first study 77 revealed unexpected aspects of the workings of the Court, it became clear 
that the empirical approach would have much wider theoretical implications.  
Measuring the influence of Member States on the evolution of jurisprudence in a specific subject 
domain opens a new perspective on the making of transnational law. This empirical method, applied 
to this particular subject-matter but potentially expandable to all areas of law, makes it possible not 
only to construct the influence of Member States on the Court but also to identify jurisprudential 
relationship between Member States and cross-country litigation strategies (do Member States team 
up to reach a certain result?). 
Of course, Legal Empirical research has limits. They are quite obvious: legal reasoning is complex and 
full of nuances whereas empirical coding overlooks the details and can produce false positives. On 
the other hand, traditional legal research cannot handle large volume of information, for obvious 
reasons of time limits and costs. However, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. On the 
contrary, if applied to the same subject-matter (ideally to the same sample) the traditional research 
can assist the empirical research to identify its inaccuracies and to correct its route. In exchange, 
empirical research can provide processing tools for a large share of information, which can enlarge 
the picture of legal analysis in ways never imagined before. We opened the gate leading to this 
avenue: the road is long, but I believe it worth pursuing. 
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